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As a distinct feature of human social interactions, spontaneous mimicry has been widely
investigated in the past decade. Research suggests that mimicry is a subtle and flexible
social behavior which plays an important role for communication and affiliation. However,
fundamental questions like why and how people mimic still remain unclear. In this
paper, we evaluate past theories of why people mimic and the brain systems that
implement mimicry in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. By reviewing recent
behavioral and neuroimaging studies on the control of mimicry by social signals, we
conclude that the subtlety and sophistication of mimicry in social contexts reflect a social
top-down response modulation (STORM) which increases one’s social advantage and this
mechanism is most likely implemented by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). We suggest
that this STORM account of mimicry is important for our understanding of social behavior
and social cognition, and provides implications for future research in autism.
Keywords: mimicry, imitation, social cognition, social interaction, medial prefrontal cortex, mirror neurons,
mentalising, top-down
INTRODUCTION
Human social interaction is complex and dynamic (Hari and
Kujala, 2009). Individuals communicate with each other bymeans
of multiple verbal and nonverbal behaviors, which rapidly change
from moment to moment. Unraveling mechanisms underlying
the subtlety of social behaviors is important for our understand-
ing of the nature of human social interaction.
One remarkable nonverbal behavior during social interactions
is spontaneous mimicry (van Baaren et al., 2009). People have a
tendency to unconsciously imitate other’s behaviors (Chartrand
and van Baaren, 2009). In the past decade, this spontaneous
mimicry has become the key focus of research in social psy-
chology and cognitive neuroscience (Heyes, 2009), and has been
regarded as a paradigm for exploring the complexity of human
social interaction. Investigations of the causes, consequences and
brain basis of mimicry have been widely carried out (Chartrand
and van Baaren, 2009). For example, social psychology suggests
that mimicry has positive consequences on social interaction; it
increases liking and affiliation between interaction partners and
makes communication more smooth and enjoyable (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999). Cognitive neuroscience further suggests that
mimicry is based on the mirror neuron system (MNS) (Catmur
et al., 2008, 2009; Heyes, 2011a). This system provides a direct link
between perception and action where observing an action auto-
matically activates the motor representation of that action (Brass
and Heyes, 2005) and this link is most likely developed by asso-
ciative sequence learning (“the ASL theory,” Heyes, 2001, 2011a;
Catmur et al., 2007, 2008, 2009).
However, two key questions still remain unclear. First, what is
the purpose of mimicry? Although the ASL theory clearly eluci-
dates how we develop the ability to mimic, it does not directly
explain under what circumstances we will mimic and why we
mimic to different degrees in different situations. Second, what
brain mechanisms control and implement mimicry responses? In
this article we aim to address these two questions by reviewing
cutting-edge research on the control of mimicry by social sig-
nals. In the first part, we give a brief outline of past theories on
the purpose of mimicry and emphasize that mimicry is a strategy
for social advantage. We provide evidence that mimicry changes
depending on the social context [i.e., social top-down response
modulation (STORM)], and suggest that this subtle control may
reflect a Machiavellian strategy for enhancing one’s social stand-
ing. In the second part, we move to a neuroscience point of
view and examine the information processing systems underly-
ing the control of mimicry. We suggest that medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) plays a key role in the control of mimicry in
social contexts. Finally, we discuss the importance of the STORM
model of mimicry in our understanding of social interaction and
social cognition. We argue that subtly controlling when and who
to mimic is essential to human competence in social interac-
tions and suggest that impairment of this function could lead to
social-communication disorders such as autism.
WHY DOWE MIMIC?
THEORIES OF MIMICRY
Mimicry is a pervasive behavior in social interaction. People
spontaneously copy a wide array of behavioral mannerisms from
other individuals such as the postures, gestures, facial expressions,
emotions, and languages (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009).
This “Chameleon effect” is not normally conscious controlled
(Chartrand and Bargh, 1999) andmost likely develops from long-
term associative learning (Heyes, 2001, 2011a). Extensive research
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suggest that mimicry is a subtle and flexible behavior which is
sensitive to social situations, the people involved, and the spe-
cific goals of the interaction at hand (Chartrand and van Baaren,
2009). The purpose (or function) of mimicry has long been
debated by social psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists.
Three major theories have been proposed so far.
First, the STORM theory of mimicry claims that mimicry
is a strategic intervention to change the social world for self-
advancement (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Lakin et al., 2003). The
theory assumes that if I mimic Anna, she unconsciously detects
the mimicry and changes her attitude toward me. Thus, I can use
mimicry as tool to make Anna like me, and will do this more if
“Anna liking me” is to my social advantage. This implementation
of mimicry is somewhat Machiavellian, in that it is strategic and
driven by the anticipated social consequences of the action. The
underlying mechanism could be unconscious and unintentional.
Evidence in favor comes from studies of the positive consequences
of mimicry, suggesting that being mimicked leads a participant to
like the mimicker (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), feel close to the
mimicker (van Baaren et al., 2004), give more money to the mim-
icker (van Baaren et al., 2003a), and be more easily persuaded by
the mimicker (Maddux et al., 2008).
The second theory claims that mimicry is a form of simu-
lation, and functions to improve interactive alignment between
two individuals and thus feed into a simulation theory of mind
(Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Gallese, 2007, 2009; Niedenthal
et al., 2010). For example, when I mimic Anna, that helps me
understand how Anna feels and gives me better insight into her
desires and intentions. Evidence in favor comes from studies
showing that preventing automatic mimicry of facial expressions
makes people slower to judge what expression is shown (Stel and
van Knippenberg, 2008). Preventing mimicry also changes brain
activation in response to seeing faces (Hennenlotter et al., 2009).
Finally, the third theory suggests that mimicry is largely an
epiphenomena arising out of domain-general processes and has
no specific social purposes or functions. This domain-general
model is an extension of the ASL theory (Heyes, 2001) but is not
explicitly stated or endorsed byHeyes. Under this model, mimicry
is not necessary to be a special social behavior but could be imple-
mented in just the same way as other over-learned non-social
responses (Heyes, 2011b). Mimicry can be modulated by social
signals, but it may assume that social modulation of mimicry is a
side-effect of simple domain-general processes such as attention,
conditioning, and disinhibition (Heyes, 2012a). Several sources
of evidence suggest that mimicry is subject to general attentional
effects (Chong et al., 2009; Heyes, 2011a, 2012b) and classical
conditioning effects (Cook et al., 2012). This means that it is
important to consider the null hypothesis that there is no ded-
icated and sophisticated mechanism for determining when and
who to mimic.
Although all three theories acknowledge the essential role of
associative learning in the development of mimicry, the positive
contributions of mimicry to social interaction, and the flexibility
and sensitivity of mimicry in social contexts (van Baaren et al.,
2009; Press et al., 2011; Heyes, 2012a), they emphasize differ-
ent functions of mimicry and thus have different predictions on
empirical evidence. The simulation theory predicts that mimicry
should be as fast and detailed as possible, to maximize inter-
active alignment (Pickering and Garrod, 2004). Thus, mimicry
should be driven by the detailed contents of imitable features
but not by social features that cannot be imitated (e.g., eye gaze
and social group membership). In contrast, the STORM theory
suggests more sophisticated mimicry, driven by integrative evalu-
ation of all social features in the current interaction. If mimicry in
the current situation can benefit one’s social standing, individuals
will increase mimicry; on the contrary, if mimicry becomes inap-
propriate at the present time, individuals will inhibit mimicry.
The domain-general model suggests that mimicry is largely deter-
mined by prior sensorimotor experience and is strongly influ-
enced by the properties of the stimulus (i.e., stimulus-driven;
Heyes, 2012a,b). Modulation of mimicry by simple domain-
general processes is possible, but the null hypothesis does not
detail any sophisticated, consequence-driven control of mimicry.
Here we review some recent data on mimicry from both social
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, which leads us to support
the STORM account.
RESEARCH ON MIMICRY FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Research in social psychology provides substantial evidence that
mimicry is sophisticatedly directed by social signals (Chartrand
and van Baaren, 2009) and this control of mimicry is for one’s
social advantage (Lakin et al., 2003). People increase mimicry
toward those who are important for their social welfare. For
example, participants show stronger mimicry to targets who are
human but not robots (Longo and Bertenthal, 2009; Liepelt and
Brass, 2010), who are attractive and nice (Likowski et al., 2008;
van Leeuwen et al., 2009; Stel et al., 2010), who are powerful and
have high social status (Cheng and Chartrand, 2003; Mastrop
et al., in preparation), and who are friends and in-group mem-
bers (Yabar et al., 2006; Bourgeois and Hess, 2008). People also
increase mimicry when their social relationship is endangered.
For example, participants show enhanced mimicry when they fail
to affiliate with other individuals (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003) or
when they are ostracized by their group members (Lakin et al.,
2008; Over and Carpenter, 2009).
Social signals not only dictate when and who to mimic,
but also carefully control what to mimic for social advantage.
Studies revealed that participants show stronger facial mimicry
of empathic expressions (e.g., sad) and less facial mimicry of neg-
ative expressions (e.g., anger) to ingroup members, compared to
outgroup members (Bourgeois and Hess, 2008). This is incon-
sistent with the simulation theory which predicts that mimicry
should not be sensitive to non-imitable features like social mem-
bership, but is compatible with the STORM theory. As the authors
explain, strong mimicry of empathic facial expressions may sig-
nal prosocial intent and thus help to enhance one’s affiliation
with ingroup members, while reduced mimicry of anger would
prevent a spiral of increased aggression and thus aids social har-
mony. This strategic control of mimicry of different emotions is
best explained by the STORMmodel.
More direct evidence of the STORM theory comes from
studies suggesting that the control of mimicry by social sig-
nals is strategically driven by the consequence of mimicry.
In most cases, mimicry produces positive social consequences
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which help one enhance interpersonal relationship and facilitate
social-communication (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). However
in special situations, mimicry may jeopardize the mimicker’s
social welfare. One example is that mimicry of dominant behav-
iors to high social status targets makes the mimicker less lik-
ing and affiliation (Tiedens and Fragale, 2003). Mastrop et al.
(in preparation) revealed that participants decreased mimicry
when high social status targets displayed dominant behaviors
and increased mimicry when high social status targets displayed
status-unrelated behaviors. Karremans and Verwijmeren (2008)
showed similar consequence-driven mimicry in another situation
where participants who were (or not) involved in a relation-
ship interact with attractive opposite-sex targets. Previous study
found that people generally increase mimicry toward attrac-
tive opposite-sex targets (van Leeuwen et al., 2009). Here the
researchers further proposed that when a man is already in
a romantic relationship, increased mimicry toward attractive
women other than his romance partner could potentially under-
mine the current relationship. As they predicted, the results sug-
gest that romantically involved participants displayed decreased
mimicry toward opposite-sex targets compared to romantically
not-involved participants. This finding suggests that the con-
trol of mimicry is sophisticatedly driven by the consequence of
mimicry and participants in romance decreasedmimicry to shield
romantic relationship with their current partner.
Finally, some evidence suggests that the subtly control of
mimicry during social interaction can be goal-directed. People
implement more mimicry when they have a goal to affiliate with
others. For example, in a study by Lakin and Chartrand (2003),
participants were either given or not given an affiliation instruc-
tion before interacting with a stranger. They found that those par-
ticipants who were instructed to get along well with the stranger
mimicked the stranger to a greater extent than those participants
who received no affiliation goal. Similar results were found when
participants were implicitly primed by an affiliation goal, such as
exposure to a prosocial attitude or interdependent self-construal
(Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren et al., 2003b; Leighton
et al., 2010; Obhi et al., 2011). In another study by Cheng and
Chartrand (2003), researchers found that participants who were
high self-monitors (i.e., those who are generally strongly moti-
vated to control their own behaviors to leave a good impression
to others) displayedmoremimicry during social interactions than
participants with low self-monitors. These two studies suggest
that people tend to display more mimicry when they have cer-
tain affiliation goals, whether it is to follow affiliation instructions
or to leave a good impression to others. Again, these findings
strongly support the STORM account of mimicry that people use
mimicry as a behavioral strategy to affiliate with others.
NEW EVIDENCE OF THE STORM THEORY FROM A SOCIAL SRC
MIMICRY PARADIGM
The above-mentioned studies in social psychology primarily
adopted a naturalistic paradigm to investigate mimicry in social
contexts where participants naturally interact with a confeder-
ate whose behaviors or traits were manipulated (Chartrand and
van Baaren, 2009). However, these paradigms are limited in their
ability to measure the time course of mimicry and to precisely
control the social environment. Here we provide new evidence
of the STORM in mimicry from recent studies using a novel
social stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) paradigm. In this
paradigm, participants are required to learn social information
about a person by vignettes or videos at first (“social cues stage”)
and then play a simple SRC task with that person (“social interac-
tion stage”) (Figure 1). In each trial of the SRC task, participants
observe a simple hand/finger movement by that person and con-
currently perform a congruent or incongruent hand/finger move-
ment. As observing an action automatically triggers the tendency
to execute that action, previous research found faster responses
to congruent than incongruent actions in SRC tasks and took
this congruency effect (CE) as a measure of mimicry (see the
methodological review by Heyes, 2011a). Thus, researchers can
manipulate different social cues about an actor (e.g., animacy,
eye gaze, niceness, social status) and test how much participants
mimic the actor using the SRC task.
First, the “human bias” feature of mimicry was re-examined
by using this social SRC paradigm (Longo and Bertenthal, 2009;
Liepelt and Brass, 2010). Previous evidence suggests that mimicry
is stronger when the observed action is performed by humans
than by non-human agents (see a review by Press, 2011). The
underlying mechanism of this effect remains controversial (Press
et al., 2006; Stanley et al., 2007, 2010). The domain-general
account attributes this animacy effect to the substantial per-
ceptual differences (e.g., kinematics and surface form) between
human and non-human action stimuli. It suggests that because
people have more sensorimotor experiences with human stim-
uli than non-human stimuli in the development, action stimuli
with human perceptual features elicit stronger motor response
than stimuli with non-human perceptual features (Press, 2011).
In contrast, the STORM account suggests that the animacy effect
primarily comes from the social nature of mimicry, because there
would be no need to use mimicry to affiliate with non-human
agents. Liepelt and Brass (2010) tested these two accounts by
manipulating participants’ belief about animacy while keeping
the perceptual features constant. They asked participants to com-
plete a finger tapping task (Figure 1, version 2) where identical
animation displayed finger movements of a hand in a leather
glove. Before running the experiment, half participants were pre-
sented with a human hand wearing the leather glove and the
other half were presented with a wooden analog hand wearing the
leather glove. The results revealed stronger mimicry when partici-
pants believed that they interacted with a human hand than when
they believed to interact with a wooden hand. As participants with
different animacy belief kept equivalent highly loaded attention
on stimuli (Leighton et al., 2010) and had the identical perceptual
inputs, this finding favors the STORM account suggesting that the
animacy effect of mimicry are not from low-level domain-general
processes, but from high-level socially specific processes.
Second, we investigated whether the eye gaze of the interac-
tion partner influences mimicry. The STORM theory of mimicry
claims that mimicry is driven by its positive social consequences,
that is, mimicry facilitates social interaction and enhances liking
and affiliation. However, the prerequisite of this affiliative conse-
quence is that the copying behaviors have to be somehow detected
by the interaction partner. As eye gaze is a critical social cue that
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FIGURE 1 | A social SRC paradigm. In this paradigm, participants
have to learn about a person (via vignettes or videos) at first (“social
cues stage”) and then play a SRC task with that person in videos
(“social interaction stage”). Two versions of SRC tasks are available:
the hand opening/closing task (Heyes et al., 2005) and the finger
tapping task (Brass et al., 2000). In hand opening/closing task
(“version 1”), participants have to always execute a pre-specified action
(e.g., hand open) when the person’s hand in the video began to move.
The person’s hand could be either open (congruent trials) or close
(incongruent trials) but participants always respond by opening their
hand. In the finger tapping task (“version 2”), participants have to press
a button by using either index or middle finger in response to a number
cue (1, index finger; 2, middle finger) while observing a congruent or
incongruent finger movement in the background. Both tasks measure
mimicry by calculating the response difference between congruent and
incongruent trials.
FIGURE 2 | Experimental design (A) and behavioral results (B) of the
control of mimicry by eye gaze (Wang et al., 2011a). (A) Participant were
shown a series of video clips where an actress did a head movement (direct
or averted gaze) and a hand movement. Only the last frame of each video is
illustrated here. Participants were required to make the same pre-specified
response (e.g., Hand Open) in every stimulus trial in a block, as quickly as
possible after the actress’ hand in video clips began to move, which could be
either a hand opening (congruent trials) or hand closing (incongruent
trials). As such, each trial fell into a 2× 2 factorial design for direct or
averted gaze, congruent or incongruent trial. (B) Mean reaction time on each
type of trials. Statistics show that there is a significant difference in the
congruency effect between direct and averted gaze conditions, and this
difference results from the facilitated congruent trials preceded by direct gaze
(the asterisk).
conveys the social knowledge of partner’s visibility on mimicry
behavior, we examined whether mimicry is subtly controlled by
partner’s gaze direction (Wang et al., 2011a). We adopted our
novel social SRC paradigmwhere participants opened (or closed)
their own hand in response to a hand-opening or hand-closing
stimuli by an actress (version 1 in Figure 1; Heyes et al., 2005).
Critically, before the actress moved her hand, she naturally per-
formed a head movement which resulted in direct gaze or averted
gaze (Figure 2A). The results demonstrate that eye gaze rapidly
and specifically modulates the mimicry of the hand actions.
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In particular, direct gaze facilitates mimicry of hand action by
13ms, compared to averted gaze (Figure 2B). These data show
that the control of mimicry is fast and selective and that mimicry
can be affected by social engagement cues. Thus, we go beyond
previous studies showing slower modulation of mimicry by the
character of the actor (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009).
More recently, we have investigated which aspect of eye gaze
contributes to this enhancement effect (Wang and Hamilton, in
preparation A). As the domain-general theory claims that all
modulations of mimicry are through general processes (Heyes,
2012a), we aimed to test whether the control of mimicry by eye
gaze is mediated by any attentional processes. Using a similar
social SRC paradigm as Wang et al. (2011a), we showed partic-
ipants a sequence of two gaze events followed by a hand action in
the SRC task. In these sequences, the actress’ hand was beside (not
in front of) her face so that face and hand are spatially separate.
The three possible gaze events were: “direct gaze,” “averted gaze”
and “gaze to the acting hand.” Each trial contained two of these
three gazes in sequence (e.g., direct-gaze followed by averted-gaze;
or averted-gaze followed by hand-gaze), giving a 3× 3 factorial
design. One critical trial type involves a joint-attention sequence
where the actress provides a direct gaze first and then gazes to the
hand. If the enhancement of mimicry is due to joint attention or
spatial attention, then mimicry should be strongest in this con-
dition. We contrast this with the three trials where direct gaze
was the second event in the sequence (following either direct,
averted or hand gaze) and the direct gaze remained during the
hand movement cue. If eye contact during action is required for
enhancement of mimicry, then the strongest mimicry should be
seen in these trials. The results revealed that only the direct-gaze-
during-action trials showed mimicry enhancement. This finding
rules out explanations of gaze-mimicry interaction in terms of
spatial attention and joint attention, and suggests that the social
cue of eye contact itself drives mimicry. The eye contact cue could
act as an ostensive signal which enhances imitation (Senju and
Csibra, 2008; Southgate et al., 2009) or could lead to an “audi-
ence effect” where participants are aware they are being watched
(Bateson et al., 2006). Further studies will be needed to distin-
guish these possibilities. Together, these studies of the influence of
eye contact on mimicry demonstrate that only direct gaze during
action engages a rapid and specific mechanism which enhances
the mimicry of hand actions. These findings suggest that the con-
trol of mimicry is a social mechanism, not a domain general one,
and are compatible with the STORM theory.
Finally, in order to examine whether the effects of social cues
on mimicry serve any specific social purposes, we investigated the
joint effect of social status and niceness on mimicry (Wang and
Hamilton, in preparation B). Participants played the social SRC
task (Figure 1, version 2) with four actresses: a nice actress with
high status, a nice actress with low status, a nasty actress with
high status and a nasty actress with low status. Past studies sug-
gest that high social status (Cheng and Chartrand, 2003; Mastrop
et al., in preparation) and nice personality (Likowski et al., 2008;
Stel et al., 2010) individually enhance mimicry. If mimicry has
no social purposes but only acts as a passive learned response to
social stimuli (i.e., “the domain-general theory”), the joint effect
should be the summation of individual effect and participants
would show greatest mimicry to nice actresses with high status.
However, if mimicry acts as an active strategy for social affiliation,
participants should show greatest mimicry to those they need to
affiliate with but technically challenging to affiliate with, such as
the nasty actress with high status. Our results support the latter
prediction and found that participants showed greatest mimicry
to the nasty actress with high status rather than the nice actress
with high status. Again, we suggest that these findings support the
STORM theory rather than a simple, stimulus-drivenmechanism.
Before finishing this section, we would like to emphasize that
our novel social SRC paradigm provides a promising approach
for future investigation of the subtlety of mimicry in social con-
texts. First, some studies have already examined the validity of
the SRC paradigm as a measure of mimicry (Heyes, 2011a). It
has been suggested that the CE in the SRC paradigms is closely
related to the “chameleon effect” in the naturalistic paradigms,
and these two paradigms share similar modulative effects by
social signals (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Leighton et al., 2010;
Cook and Bird, 2011a,b; Heyes, 2011a). Second, the novel social
SRC paradigm has some advantages over the classic naturalistic
paradigm. Social signals aremore carefully controlled in the social
SRC paradigm. Researchers can accurately manipulate the type,
onset and duration of a social signal and measure correspond-
ing mimicry with multiple trials per person in a within-subject
design (note that most mimicry studies in naturalistic paradigms
are between-subject design). Meanwhile, the social SRC paradigm
allows us to investigate the control of mimicry by rapid social
cues such as eye gaze (Wang et al., 2011a). Comparing with the
naturalistic paradigm which examines modulations of mimicry
over a couple of minutes (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009), the
social SRC paradigm optimizes the measurement of control of
mimicry into a second-by-second timescale, which is ideal for fur-
ther application of neuroimaging techniques (Wang et al., 2011b).
Finally, the social SRC paradigm can provide us important hints
about the underlying mechanisms of the control of mimicry by
social signals. As mimicry is measured by the response differ-
ences between congruent and incongruent trials, we can roughly
infer whether the social signal impacts mimicry process per se
(i.e., congruent trials) or the process of inhibition of mimicry
(i.e., incongruent trials). For example, in our gaze-mimicry study
(Wang et al., 2011a), we found that direct gaze enhances mimicry
mainly through the congruent trials rather than incongruent tri-
als (Figure 2B), which suggests that eye gaze directly influences
the mimicry process per se, but not the process of the inhibition
of mimicry.
In summary, substantial evidence from social psychology and
SRC paradigms supports the STORM theory of mimicry, which
claims that people strategically control mimicry for their social
advantage. Social signals subtly and sophisticatedly guide when
and who tomimic andmakemimicry behaviormore efficient and
adaptive. However, what is the neural mechanism underlying this
STORM of mimicry?
HOW DOWEMIMIC?
Without question, it is challenging to directly investigate the
neural mechanism of mimicry during social interaction because
of its complexity and dynamics. However, understanding why
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we mimic can also contribute to our understanding of how we
mimic, and of the brain mechanisms which support flexible and
socially meaningful mimicry behavior. We outlined three mod-
els above—a STORM model in which mimicry is controlled for
social advantage; a simulation model in which mimicry aids
interactive alignment, and a domain general model in which
mimicry is controlled by general mechanisms. We suggest that
these three models can bemapped on to the debate about the rela-
tionship between mirror systems and mentalising systems in the
human brain. The MNS are located in the inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG), inferior parietal cortex (IPL) and superior/middle tem-
poral sulcus/gyrus (STS/MTG), and are engaged by both obser-
vation and execution of action (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004). They have been strongly linked to the
implementation of mimicry and other visual-motor responses
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; Catmur et al., 2008, 2009; Bien et al., 2009;
Heyes, 2011a). Mentalising systems are found in temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) and mPFC and are engaged when participants
must judge other people’s mental states or other social features
(van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The relationship between
these two brain networks and their relative roles in social cog-
nition is a matter of much debate (Brass et al., 2007; Csibra, 2007;
Uddin et al., 2007; Hickok, 2009).
We suggest that the interactions between these two brain net-
works during mimicry are different for each model (Figure 3).
If mirror systems respond to and mimic an observed action,
and this information feeds up to mentalising systems, this rep-
resents a simulation process (Figure 3, arrow A). The action
representation in the mirror systems aids interactive alignment
and thus enhances mentalising. In contrast, if social judgements
frommentalising systems are used to control the implementation
of mimicry in the mirror system, this represents a top-down con-
trol process, i.e., STORM (Figure 3, arrow B). Social evaluation
frommentalising system acts as a controller of mimicry. If mirror
systems and mentalising system are independent during mimicry,
this favors the domain-general model suggesting that mimicry is
not controlled by any specific social processes.
All three models encompass current theories suggesting that
mimicry arises from associative learning (the ASL model, Heyes,
2001), and focus instead on how basic mimicry processes relate to
other components of social cognition (Figure 3). Distinguishing
these models will help to determine why people mimic and will
define the neural mechanisms underlying mimicry. Here, we will
review previous evidence of the brain systems for the inhibition
of mimicry and introduce our recent neuroimaging data on the
brain systems for the social control of mimicry. We suggest that
the evidence favors the STORMmodel.
NEURAL MECHANISMS OF THE INHIBITION OF MIMICRY
To some extent, the implementation of mimicry by the MNS
makes mimicry act as a prepotent response tendency—observing
an action automatically triggers the tendency to execute that
action. Since mimicry is not adaptive in every situation, the
question that arises is how such a tendency to mimic is pre-
vented from leading to over-mimicry symptoms such as echolalia
and echopraxia (i.e., excessive repetition of other’s speech or
observed actions) or inappropriate mimicry such as copying
FIGURE 3 | Three brain models for information processing during
mimicry. Mimicry is implemented in mirror neuron system (lower half) and
developed by associative sequence learning (ASL), but it is not clear how
this system interact with mentalising system (top half). When mimicry
information feeds up to aid social evaluation (arrow A), this enhances
simulation of the other person (“the simulation model”). Social top-down
response modulation (STORM) model is illustrated by arrow B, showing
how social information can guide and monitor mimicry response. When
there is no interaction between mirror neuron system and mentalising
system, the control of mimicry could be mediated by other domain-general
processes (“the domain-general model”).
dominant behaviors from high status people. Moreover, a sim-
ple direct-mapping mechanism provided by the MNS cannot
fully explain the complexity and dynamic of mimicry in social
interactions (Southgate and Hamilton, 2008). As mimicry is sub-
tly and sophisticatedly controlled by social signals, there must be
some controlling systems supervising theMNS according to social
contexts.
Early clinical observation suggests that the inhibition of inap-
propriate response tendencies is a function of the prefrontal lobes.
Patients with prefrontal lesions have difficulties in tasks involving
inhibition of prepotent responses (such as Stroop task and the
go/no-go paradigm) and sometimes display over-mimicry symp-
toms such as echolalia and echopraxia (Luria, 1980; Lhermitte
et al., 1986; Vendrell et al., 1995; De Renzi et al., 1996). Later
neuroimaging studies using the classic SRC paradigm support
this observation and further suggest mPFC and TPJ are two key
brain regions for the inhibition of mimicry (Brass et al., 2001,
2005). Stronger activations in mPFC and TPJ were observed
when participants have to inhibit their natural tendency to mimic
in incongruent trials. Interestingly, these two regions are both
anatomically and functionally different from the systems respon-
sible for the Stroop task (e.g., dorsolateral PFC, ACC) (Brass et al.,
2003, 2005). This shows that control of imitation is distinct from
other simple forms of cognitive control, and thus argues against a
domain-general theory of the control of mimicry.
Recent studies suggest that the inhibition of mimicry is closely
associated with mentalising processes (Brass et al., 2009). As
mPFC and TPJ are two brain regions that engage in both men-
talising tasks (Frith and Frith, 1999) and inhibition of mimicry
tasks (Brass et al., 2001, 2005), Brass and his colleagues (2009)
proposed that these two processes are linked. They did several
behavioral studies to test this idea. In the first study, Spengler
et al. (2010c) implemented the SRC and Theory of Mind tasks in
both healthy participants and neuropsychological patients with
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prefrontal lesions or TPJ lesions, to examine whether there is
a functional association between the inhibition of mimicry and
mentalising abilities. The results showed a highly significant cor-
relation between mimicry control and the abilities to mental
attribution in both health participants and patient with lesions.
In the second study, Spengler et al. (2010a) implemented the same
experiment design on individuals with autism, who are known to
have difficulties with mentalising. Similar to those patients with
prefrontal or TPJ lesions, the results suggest that mentalising abil-
ities in autism are positively correlated with their inhibition of
mimicry: the worse individuals with autism performed in the
mentalising tasks, the less they were able to inhibit their auto-
matic mimicry. A key question arises here: what is the cognitive
overlap between mentalising and inhibition of mimicry? Brass
et al. (2009) suggest that both require good self-other distinction.
In the third study, Spengler et al. (2010b) directly manipulated
the processes for self-other distinction when healthy participants
were performing the SRC task. In half of the blocks, partici-
pants were asked to do the task with two mirrors placed on
each side of the monitor, so that participants could see their
face and upper part of the body reflected in the mirror (“self-
focus” condition). In the other half blocks, the mirrors were
turned around with the non-reflective side facing the subjects
(“no self-focus” condition). Results showed that comparing with
no self-focus conditions, participants showed stronger inhibi-
tion of mimicry during self-focus conditions, which suggests
that increasing self-other distinction leads to enhanced inhibi-
tion of mimicry. Interestingly, a recent study by Santiesteban
et al. (2012) supports this close relationship in the other direc-
tion. They trained participants to inhibit the tendency to mimic
and then measured their performance in tasks requiring self-
other distinction. They found that, compared with no-training
groups, participants with inhibition training showed improved
performance on a visual perspective-taking task, which suggests
that enhanced inhibition of mimicry leads to enhanced self-other
distinction process. To sum up, these findings consistently sug-
gest that the inhibition of mimicry and mentalising processes
all share cognitive components such as the self-other distinction
in mPFC and TPJ. These components are specifically social, not
domain-general.
SOCIAL CONTROL OF MIMICRY
As outlined above, the inhibition of mimicry is linked to some
types of social information processing such as the self-other
distinction. However, this does not explain the information pro-
cessing behind the decision of when to mimic and when to inhibit
mimicry. Behavioral studies show that mimicry responses change
dependent on the social context, but it is not yet clear how this
could be implemented. Again, recent data suggests that mPFC
responds to social cues such as eye gaze and social status (Kampe
et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004; Zink et al., 2008) and has a key role
in monitoring other social processes (Teufel et al., 2010). mPFC is
also an important region in monitoring of task responses asso-
ciated with social rewards or punishment (Amodio and Frith,
2006). Thus, we suggest that mPFC could be a good candidate
for implementing STORM in many social contexts, though other
components of the social brain are also likely to contribute.
We tested this idea by examining the neural mechanism of the
eye contact effect on mimicry (Wang et al., 2011b). Participants
performed a social SRC task with eye gaze priming as Wang
et al. (2011a) (see Figure 2) during fMRI scanning. The fMRI
results showed that performing the SRC task activated the MNS
while observation of direct gaze and inhibition of mimicry both
engaged mPFC. These findings were consistent with previous
studies (Brass et al., 2001, 2005; Senju and Johnson, 2009).
Critically, three brain regions showed an interaction between the
eye gaze present on a trial and whether mimicry was inhibited
or enhanced. These were the mirror system regions STS and IFG,
together with mPFC (Figure 4A). This result is compatible with
our hypothesis that mPFC is controlling mimicry implemented
by STS and IFG.
We then used dynamic causal modeling (DCM) to investigate
the information processing between these regions (Figure 4B).
In the optimal model, three features stand out. First, there was
strong intrinsic connectivity strength from mPFC to IFG and
from mPFC to STS (solid white arrows in Figure 4B), which sug-
gests that mPFC constantly exerts top-down control on the MNS.
Second, when participants performed the SRC task (compared
to a baseline task), the connectivity strength from STS to IFG
increased, suggesting that these regions implement the visuomo-
tor mapping for the task. Finally, the interaction of direct gaze
and mimicry enhances the connection strength from mPFC to
STS, which suggests that mPFC is the originator of the gaze-
mimicry interaction and that it modulates sensory input (i.e.,
STS) to the MNS. This study is the first to investigate the underly-
ing neural mechanism of the control of mimicry by social signals,
and demonstrated that mPFC subtly controls mimicry accord-
ing to gaze directions by modulating the sensory input of the
MNS. It demonstrated how different components of the social
brain work together to control mimicry according to the gaze
direction. It provides strong support for the STORM model of
mimicry that social judgments frommentalising systems are used
to top-down control mimicry. In the future, it will be interesting
to test whether other social cues modulate mimicry through the
mediation of mPFC and whether other brain regions for social
evaluation/monitoring (e.g., ventral striatum, basolateral amyg-
dala) are also involved in the STORM of mimicry (Singer et al.,
2004; Zink et al., 2008).
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The STORM model of mimicry we discussed in this paper has
several important implications for our understanding of mimicry
and human social behavior. First, the claim that mimicry is
socially top-down modulated means that even this rapid, uncon-
scious, learning-dependent behavior is subtly controlled by social
goals. This control seems to include the somewhat Machiavellian
goal of increasing one’s social standing and welfare. The STORM
ofmimicry could be built on top of non-specific associative learn-
ing mechanism (Heyes, 2001) but goes beyond it with dedicated
social mechanisms that use mimicry as a social strategy. The
evidence we reviewed above hint at the remarkable sophistica-
tion of this mechanism—it can implement both inhibition and
enhancement of mimicry (Wang et al., 2011b), and it evaluates
the social meaning of each event rather than simply responding
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FIGURE 4 | The neural mechanism of the eye contact effect
on mimicry. (A) the fMRI results showed three brain regions
specifically for the gaze-mimicry interaction: mPFC, STS, and IFG;
and (B) the DCM further suggested a best model where the
mimicry increases the connectivity strength from STS to IFG
during the SRC task (blue line) and the direct gaze controls
mimicry by modulating the connection strength from mPFC
to STS (red line).
to positive stimulus features (Wang and Hamilton, in prepara-
tion B). Further work will be needed to define the limits of
mimicry control and to determine how different types of social
information and social goals contribute to this process. In par-
ticular, the relationship between the modulation of mimicry by
semantic priming (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Leighton et al.,
2010) and the control of mimicry by social cues remains unclear.
It is also important to consider what might happen when
the control of mimicry breaks down. As mentioned above, both
echopraxia/echolalia and utilisation behavior are seen in patients
with prefrontal lobe damage, suggesting poor control of pre-
potent responses in this group (De Renzi et al., 1996). Deficits
in imitation and mimicry have also been reported in partici-
pants with autistic spectrum disorder (Williams et al., 2004), and
some have linked this to the functioning of the MNS (Williams
et al., 2001; Oberman et al., 2005; Oberman and Ramachandran,
2007). However, increasing evidence points to typical mirror neu-
ron responses in participants with autism (Dinstein et al., 2010;
Marsh and Hamilton, 2011), meaning that a “broken mirror sys-
tem” cannot be the origin of poor mimicry in autism (Southgate
and Hamilton, 2008). As STORM of mimicry is important for
functional mimicry and one’s social competency, here we sug-
gest that the control of mimicry might be abnormal in autistic
individuals. It is now known that the mPFC, the key brain region
for the control of mimicry, is abnormal in autism (Kennedy et al.,
2006; Gilbert et al., 2009). Recent data from (Cook and Bird,
2011a,b) directly suggests that abnormality of mPFC in autis-
tic populations or immaturity of mPFC in adolescents lead to
poor control of mimicry. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that poor
social top-down control of mimicry is responsible for abnormal
mimicry behavior in autism (Hamilton, 2008). Further research
will be needed to test this possibility.
CONCLUSION
This paper has evaluated theories of why people mimic and the
brain systems that implement mimicry. We suggest that current
data favor a STORM model of mimicry, in which mimicry is
carefully controlled to maximize one’s social advantage. Recent
fMRI data implicate mPFC in this control process. Future studies
should examine how different types of social information are used
in the control of mimicry and whether the control of mimicry is
abnormal in autism.
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